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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged Jesse Adams with two counts of grand theft. In Count II, the State
alleged that Mr. Adams stole credit, services, and merchandise from Idaho Interior Services,
LLC (hereinafter I.I.S.), by making unauthorized charges on a company debit card.1 At his trial,
Mr. Adams did not dispute that he used the debit card to charge business-related expenses, but he
asserted that as a co-owner of I.I.S., he did not need anyone’s permission to do so. The jury
found Mr. Adams not guilty of grand theft as alleged in Count II, and instead found him guilty of
the lesser included offense of petit theft. Relying upon the same evidence it presented to the
jury, the State sought $15,053.49 in restitution related to Mr. Adams’ use of the company credit
card. Mr. Adams objected to the State’s request for any amount over $999.99, based upon the
fact that the jury acquitted him of grand theft, and found him guilty only of petit theft. The
district court overruled Mr. Adams’ objection and ordered him to pay the full amount sought by
the State related to that charge.
Mr. Adams asserts the district court abused its discretion by acting outside the bounds of
its lawful authority, by ordering Mr. Adams to pay the full amount of restitution sought by the
State related to Count II, because the district court had no lawful authority to order restitution in
an amount of $1,000.00 or greater for that charge, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304. (App. Br., pp.814.) In response, the State argues that the district court was authorized to order $15,053.49 in
restitution related to Count II, despite the fact that the jury acquitted Mr. Adams of grand theft,
because Mr. Adams was convicted petit theft, which is “a crime,” and the amount of restitution

1

Mr. Adams does not raise any issues related to his conviction for grand theft as alleged in
Count I, or the subsequent restitution order.
1

may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Resp., Br., pp.4-13.) The State’s arguments are without merit.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Adams articulated the relevant facts and course of proceedings in the Appellant’s
Brief, and they are repeated herein only where necessary to address the State’s arguments.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Adams to pay Idaho Interior Services
$15,053.49 in restitution stemming from his conviction for petit theft?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams To Pay $15,053.49 In
Restitution Stemming From His Conviction For Petit Theft
The issue presented in this appeal is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation,
i.e., whether I.C. § 19-5304 grants the district court the authority to order a defendant to pay
restitution for alleged criminal conduct for which he was acquitted. Idaho courts have no
inherent power to order restitution; instead, a court’s authority to order restitution is granted by
the legislature. See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013); State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37
(Ct. App. 2002). “The interpretation of a statute ‘must begin with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply
follows the law as written.’” Verska v. State Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho
889, 893 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003).)

A.

The State’s Statutory Construction Argument Is Contrary To The Plain Language Of
Idaho Code § 19-5304
The State argues that I.C. § 19-5304 empowers a trial court to order a defendant to pay

restitution for economic loss suffered by a victim, so long as a defendant is convicted of some
crime, and there is a causal connection between that crime and the economic loss. (Resp.
Br., pp.6-13.) This, of course, is generally true. As the State correctly notes, I.C. § 19-5304(2)
allows a court to order “a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss
to the victim to make restitution to the victim,” provided there is a causal connection between the
defendant’s criminal act and the claimed economic loss, see State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599
(2011), and the court must consider the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7), in order to
determine the appropriate amount of restitution.
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(Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) In the State’s view,

because Mr. Adams was convicted of a crime – petit theft – the court was empowered to order
him to pay restitution for any amount of economic loss the court found, by a preponderance of
the evidence, resulted from Mr. Adams’ criminal conduct. (Resp. Br., pp.6-13.) In makes no
difference, the State reasons, that the jury acquitted Mr. Adams of grand theft – any crime will
do. (Id.)
In making this argument, the State ignores the fact that the legislature defined what it
meant by the words, “found guilty of any crime,” it used in I.C. § 19-5304(2). (Resp. Br., pp.613.) Idaho Code § 19-5304(1)(b) states, “‘Found guilty of any crime’ shall mean a finding by a
court that a defendant has committed a criminal act and shall include an entry of a plea of guilty,
an order withholding judgment, suspending sentence, or entry of judgment of conviction for a
misdemeanor or felony.”

I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b) (emphasis added). The Court may order a

defendant to pay restitution only for the crime the defendant is found guilty of having committed,
beyond a reasonable doubt, not the crime the State alleged he committed, but failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State’s only mention of I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b) is its claim that that provision “does not
define the scope of restitution that can be ordered under the statute. Rather, the language is part
of the threshold determination that opens the door for the court to order restitution.” (Resp.
Br., p.11.) But by its plain language, I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b) both opens the door for the court to
order restitution and defines the scope of the restitution that may be ordered. Idaho Code § 195304(2) allows a district court to “order a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an
economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the victim,” and I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b) defines
found guilty of any crime, in relevant part, to mean those criminal acts reflected in the judgment
of conviction. The State’s argument would essentially have this Court read § 19-5304(1)(b) as
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stating, “‘Found guilty of any crime’ shall mean a finding by the court that the defendant
committed a criminal act,” and then erase the remaining language the legislature sought fit to
include in its definition, thereby freeing the trial court to order restitution for any crime it
believed the defendant committed, regardless of the jury’s verdict. This Court has no authority
to re-write a statute to fit the State’s preferred meaning, and the State’s interpretation of
I.C. § 19-5304 is incomplete and erroneous.

B

The State Mischaracterizes Schultz And Fails To Acknowledge The Opinion Supports
Mr. Adams’ Argument
The State relies upon the Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884

(Ct. App. 2008), in support of its argument. (Resp. Br., pp.4, 7, 13.) In Schultz, the State
charged the defendant with having committed two counts of grand theft, and four counts of
forgery, and she was convicted of all counts. Id. at 885. One of the grand theft counts stemmed
from the defendant’s unauthorized use of the victim’s credit card, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s restitution order that included unauthorized transactions that were
not introduced into evidence at trial. Id. at 885-87. From this, the State reasons that “Schultz
demonstrates that the restitution award need not be solely based on transactions proved at trial.”
(Resp. Br., p.7.)
But the State fails to mention language in the Schultz opinion that is directly contrary to
the State’s position on appeal, and which is supportive of Mr. Adams’ argument. The Schultz
Court recognized that, “Except where the parties have consented, a defendant cannot be required
to pay restitution for damages stemming from separate, uncharged and unproven crimes.
Schultz, 148 Idaho at 886 (citing State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis
added)). The Court recognized that “Restitution depends on the existence of the crime for which
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the offender was convicted,” and held that “restitution is statutorily available for all unauthorized
transactions as a direct result of defendant's criminal conduct and conviction for grand theft . . .
during the time frame in question.” Schultz, 148 Idaho at 886-87. Unlike in Schultz, Mr. Adams
was acquitted of grand theft, and therefore the district court did not have the authority to order
him to pay restitution as if he had been convicted of grand theft.
The State also mischaracterizes Mr. Adams’ reliance upon the Court of Appeals’ holding
in State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868 (Ct. App. 1991), distinguishing that case by noting, “The
unauthorized debit transactions here were not uncharged thefts; they were the thefts underlying
the second count of grand theft in the information.” (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) But Mr. Adams did
not argue that Aubert “controls,” and noted the very distinction the State makes between the facts
in that case and the facts of his case. (App. Br., p.13.) More significantly, the State argues that
Schultz should control over Aubert because it was a more recent decision, but fails to
acknowledge that the Schultz court cited Aubert in support of its holding. See Schultz, 148 Idaho
at 886-87. In support of its statement acknowledging, “Restitution depends on the existence of
the crime for which the offender was convicted,” the Schultz Court cited to Auburt, 119 Idaho at
870, n.5. Schultz, 148 Idaho at 886-87. The Aubert footnote the Schultz Court relied upon states,
“As a general rule, restitution depends on the existence of the crime for which the offender was
convicted and a person may not be ordered to pay restitution for a crime for which he was not
convicted. Aubert, 119 Idaho at 870 n.5 (citing 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1774(a) p.431 (1989)
(emphasis added)). In short, Schultz did not call into question the Aubert Court’s reasoning, but
instead emphasized its importance, and the opinion supports Mr. Adams’ Argument that the
district court did not have the authority to order him to pay restitution for an alleged crime for
which he was acquitted.
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C.

Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) Does Not Allow A Trial Court To Second-Guess The Jury’s
Verdict Using The Preponderance Of The Evidence Standard
The State argues, “The fact that the amount of economic loss proven ($15,053.49)

exceeded the maximum amount defining the offense ($999) was proper because restitution may
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, while the amount of loss for purposes of the
conviction itself must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Resp. Br., p.9 (citing Richmond,
137 Idaho at 37-38).) The State’s understanding of the jury’s role in his case is fundamentally
flawed.
The jury was not asked to determine “the amount of economic loss for purposes of the
conviction” I.I.S. suffered – the jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Adams committed
grand theft, and if it found him not guilty of that, whether Mr. Adams committed petit theft.
(R., pp.260-62 (jury instructions related to Count II).) This was not a case where Mr. Adams
admitted that he committed a theft through his unauthorized use of I.I.S.’s credit card, but argued
the amount he stole did not meet the $1,000.00 threshold for grand theft. Instead, Mr. Adams
admitted that he put $15,053.49 on his I.I.S. debit card, but he explained to the jury that as the
co-owner of the business, he did not need anyone’s authorization before doing so. (Tr., p.190,
L.23 – p.212, L.4; p.436, Ls.7-22; 444, L.10 – p.458, L.4.) The jury specifically rejected the
State’s allegation that Mr. Adams’ actions amounted to grand theft. (R., p.273 (verdict for Count
II)). It seems likely that the jury accepted Mr. Adams’ explanation that he did not need anyone’s
permission to use the company debit card, but found Mr. Adams guilty of petit theft, based upon
the $26.49 charge at the Silverwood Theme Park, which was the only charge Mr. Adams could
not explain. (Tr., p.444, Ls.15-21.)
More importantly, the preponderance standard applies only to the determination of the
economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the crime reflected in the judgment of
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conviction, I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b), not the crime the State alleged the defendant committed.
I.C. § 19-5304(6). The legislature saw fit to limit the restitution a court can order to those crimes
for which the defendant either pleaded guilty, thereby admitting his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, or was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(b). The State’s
reading of I.C. § 19-5304(6) would allow a trial court to second-guess the jury’s actual verdict
and make its own determination of what crime Mr. Adams committed, using a preponderance of
the evidence standard. But the preponderance standard is used to determine the amount of
economic loss the victim suffered as a result of the crime for which the defendant was actually
convicted, not the crime the State alleged or the court believed the defendant committed. See
I.C. § 19-5304(6). The State’s argument is without merit.

D.

The State Erroneously Claims The Richmond Decision Was Based Upon The Plain
Language Of I.C. § 19-5304, Rather Than That Court’s Understanding Of The Policy
Behind The Statute
The State claims that Mr. Adams provided an “inaccurate portrayal” of the Richmond

opinion by arguing that case was decided based upon “a perceived policy behind the restitution
statute, rather than the statute itself.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) The State argues the Richmond Court
merely “referred to the policy behind the restitution statute, but it based its decision on the
statute’s language that restitution may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Resp.
Br., p.11 (citing Richmond, 137 Idaho at 38).)

It is the State that inaccurately portrays

Richmond.
Per the Richmond Court:
In making its decision, the district court explained:
I think given the legislature’s preference to making victims of
crimes whole and the fact that the statute says it can be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence as opposed to beyond a reasonable
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doubt, I think there is a basis to impose restitution in an amount
greater than the statutory amount for the crime itself.
We agree with the district court’s reasoning. It is often stated that the policy
behind our restitution statute favors full compensation to crime victims who
suffer economic loss. See [State v.] Bybee, 115 Idaho [541,] 543 [Ct. App. 1989].
By establishing that economic losses are to be determined by a civil
preponderance of the evidence standard, I.C. § 19-5304(6), the legislature clearly
intended to allow trial courts in a criminal case to resolve the restitution question,
thus freeing the crime victim of the burden of instituting a civil action based on
the same conduct, and our court system from unnecessary, repetitive
trials. See State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280 (Minn., 1996.) Furthermore, we are
not persuaded that the legislature intended, when it enacted I.C. § 19-5304, to
create exceptions for those crimes that designate monetary amounts in their
defining elements, i.e., grand theft, petty theft, and the two grades of malicious
injury to property. Rather, the statute clearly intends for full restitution to be
ordered on economic loss from one’s criminal conduct or criminal act.
Richmond, 137 Idaho at 38-39 (emphasis added). The Richmond Court’s reference to the “policy
behind our restitution statute,” and its repeated reference to the legislature’s intent, unequivocally
shows the that the Court’s holding in that case was based upon its interpretation of the policy
behind, and the legislature’s intent in passing, I.C. § 19-5304. The Richmond Court referred to
the preponderance standard contained in I.C. § 19-5304(6) in order to determine the legislature’s
intent, and concluded, “we are not persuaded that the legislature intended, when it
enacted I.C. § 19-5304, to create exceptions for those crimes that designate monetary amounts in
their defining elements, i.e., grand theft, petty theft, and the two grades of malicious injury to
property.”

Richmond, 137 Idaho at 39 (emphasis added).

The State’s description of the

Richmond decision is inaccurate.
Additionally, the State argues, “The difference in burdens of proof reflect the purpose of
the restitution proceeding—to provide the victim a means of obtaining recompense without
having to file a separate civil action.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State goes on to quote from other
cases discussing the purpose of Idaho’s restitution statute and its use of the preponderance of the
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evidence standard. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (citations omitted).) But “‘The asserted purpose for
enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.’” Verska v. State Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011) (quoting Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr.
Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 191-92 (2010)). In short, the State makes the same mistake the Richmond
Court made – relying on the purported purpose of I.C. § 19-5304 to define a court’s authority to
order restitution, rather than the plain language of the statute. The State’s argument is without
merit.

E.

The State’s Reliance Upon Authority From Other States Is Misplaced
The State cites state court decisions from Wyoming, Florida, Washington, Oregon, and

Kansas, in support of its argument that the Idaho Court of Appeals decided Richmond correctly.
(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Those decisions are irrelevant. An Idaho trial court’s authority to order
restitution stems from Idaho statutes, and Idaho appellate courts interpret Idaho statutes based
upon the plain language of those statutes, not on how another state’s courts interpret that state’s
restitution laws. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-93. This Court should disregard this irrelevant
jurisprudence from other states.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s restitution
order, and remand the case to the district court with instructions that the court order no more than
$999.99 in restitution related to Mr. Adams’ conviction for petit theft for his use of the I.I.S debit
card.
DATED this 9th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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